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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Whether the Third District Court erred in denying 
defendant's Motion For New Trial as the prosecutor, during his 
summation, unfairly called attention to what he characterized as 
an oversight on the part of defense counsel in allowing the 
defendant to explain, during his testimony, how the fingerprints 
could have been his when defendant also put on evidence to 
explain why the fingerprints were not his. 
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence, as a matter 
of law, to submit the case to the jury when the case consisted of 
inconclusive, circumstantial evidence, and the experts called by 
the State and the defendant disagreed as to whether the finger-
prints on the door of the victim's home could be identified 
and classified with reasonable scientific certainty. 
3. Whether the Court erred in allowing heresy evidence 
to be introduced regarding the deceased victim's state of mind 
relating to her alleged fear of defendant to be introduced when 
there was no issues of self defense, suicide, or accident raised 
by either party, and whether the Court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to express his personal opinion as to the veracity of 
defendant's witnesses and defendant's guilt during the summation 
of the case, when such conduct was an obvious violation of the 
Canons of Ethics. 
4. Whether the Court erred in allowing the video tape 
of the victim's body and the investigation conducted in her 
mobile home by the police to be admitted into evidence and shown 
to the jury both during plaintifffs case in chief and during the 
jury's deliberation, when still photographs had already been 
introduced by the State showing the body and the relevant 
furnishings and utensils at the scene, and when such video 
concentrated on the dead body and the open throat wound she had 
received, thereby inflaming the jury's passions and prejudices. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of defendant, 
Jerry J. Dibello, on January 6, 1986 in the Third District Court 
in and for Tooele County, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge 
presiding, of the crime of Criminal Homicide: Murder ±n the 
Second Degree, a 1st Degree Felony in violation of Sec^* n 
76-5-203, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and the Order of said Cv 
entered March 24, 1986 denying defendant's Motion ior a New Trial 
requested on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 9:30 a.m. on July 21, 1985, the body of 
Tammy Dibello was discovered in her mobile home located in the 
S&W Trailer Park in Lakepoint, Tooele County, Utah by Larry 
Smith, a neighbor. (Testimony of Larry Smith pp. 49-52.) The 
cause of death was determined by Dr. Armano Salazar, who is 
employed by the State of Utah, Office of the Medical Examiner, as 
multiple stab wounds. (Testimony of Dr. Salazar, p.310 of the 
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transcript,) The defendant, Jerry Dibello, was married to the 
victim, but separated from her at the time of her death. 
(Testimony of Larry Smith p.45, Teresa Sterns p.86, Shane 
Jacobsen pp.162-164, Tracy AA p.653, and Jerry Dibello pp. 867 & 
878.) He had been to the victim's home on the evening of July 
20, 1985 to obtain his clothing. He arrived at the SSeW Trailer 
Park sometime between 10:00 p.m. (Testimony of Bill Jackson p.110 
and defendant p. 895.) and 11:00 p.m. (Testimony of Dennis 
Haggard p. 130.) on July 20, 1985 and found his wife at the 
trailer of B.J. Jackson. (Testimony of Bill Jackson pp. 108-109, 
Dennis Haggard p.127 and defendant p. 895.) The defendant then 
left B.J. Jackson's trailer and shortly thereafter, the victim 
also left Mr. Jackson's trailer. (Testimony of Bill Jackson 
p.110, Dennis Haggard pp. 131 & 133, and defendant p. 895.) No 
one reports having seen the victim from that time until her body 
was discovered the following morning. At least one other person, 
Shane Jacobsen, admitted to visiting the victim's home that same 
night. (Testimony of Shane Jacobsen p. 174.) A note from Mr. 
Jacobsen to the victim, which he admits to writing on the night 
of July 20, 1985, was found at the scene of the murder. (Testi-
mony of Shane Jacobsen p. 175 and Alan James p. 714.) 
On Monday, July 22, 1985, defendant was arrested in Salt 
Lake County for the crime of Second Degree Murder, a 1st Degree 
Felony. Defendant was bound over by the Sixth Circuit Court to 
stand trial on August 1, 1985 in the Third District Court in and 
for Tooele County, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. The 
only physical evidence of the defendant's presence at the 
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premises or connection to the crime presented at trial was a hand 
print smeared in blood on the outside of the front door of the 
victim's mobile home. (Testimony of Lynn Bush p.693, Alan James 
p.709, Plaintiffs Exhibits 4, 27, 30, 31, 32 and 67.) Finger-
print experts for the prosecution identified the print as being 
that of the defendant. (Testimony of Rick Summers pp. 359-360 & 
392 and Scott Pratt p.971.) Defendant's fingerprint expert, Wade 
Robinson, testified the print could not be identified as being 
defendant's. (Testimony of Wade Robinson pp. 799-801, 808 8c 
814.) After the lifting of the prints, there was not sufficient 
blood remaining to determine the blood type. (Testimony of Martha 
Kerr pp. 452-453.) A verdict of guilty for the crime charged was 
entered on December 18, 1985. Defendant was sentenced on January 
6, 1986 to serve a term of not less than five (5) years and which 
may be for life in the Utah State Prison. Defendant filed a 
motion for new trial on January 15, 1986 on the grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct, which motion was denied by the Court in 
its Order entered March 24, 1986. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant's argument centers on the misconduct of 
the prosecutor, and the errors of the trial court in three areas: 
submitting the case to the jury on the evidence presented by the 
State, allowing hearsay evidence of the victim's state of mind to 
be introduced and allowing the jury to view a color video tape 
recording made by the police which concentrated on the corpse at 
the scene of the crime when still photographs had already been 
introduced of the relevant items existing at the scene. 
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During closing argument, the prosecutor committed two 
egregious errors. He drew the jurors1 attention to what he 
argued was an error in the way the defendant's attorney had 
presented his case, and argued that the supposed error was 
evidence of the defendant's guilt. The prosecutor argued that 
the defendant was guilty because his attorney had erroneously let 
the defendant explain during direct examination how his bloody 
hand print could have existed on the door to the victim's 
dwelling after the defence had introduced expert testimony which 
concluded that the hand print could not be identified scien-
tifically. The prosecutor also breached the Canons of Ethics by 
expressing his personal opinion or judgment regarding the 
veracity of the defendant's witnesses and the guilt of the 
defendant. These errors alone are so material as to warrant a 
reversal of the defendant's conviction. 
The prosecutor's errors during summation become even 
more prejudicial and thusly require a reversal when the Court's 
errors are considered. A review of the transcript reveals that 
the evidence against the defendant was totally circumstantial 
except for the bloody hand print found on the victim's dwelling. 
While defendant does not argue that circumstantial evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilt, in this instance, the 
circumstantial which the jury was told was sufficient to prove 
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt clearly was not, 
and the Court erred in allowing the case to go to the jury. 
Particulary was it error to allow the case to go to the 
jury when the Court allowed hearsay statements of the deceased 
victim to be introduced to the effect that she feared the 
defendant, when there was no issue raised at trial as to self-
defense, suicide or accident, and the state of mind of the victim 
was totally irrelevant and immaterial to the issues before the 
Court. Furthermore, the said statements of the victim were not 
supported with sufficient indicia of truthfulness to warrant 
their admission even if the victim's state of mind had been at 
issue. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the misconduct of 
the prosecutor is seen to have compounded the errors of the Court 
in allowing the video taped investigation of the crime scene to 
be shown to the jury. The tape was filmed from a perspective to 
the foot of the victim's corpse and showed the gruesome scene of 
her dead and mutilated body for approximately one hour. The jury 
was allowed to view the tape even though still photographs of a 
less gruesome and inflammatory nature had already been introduced 
by the prosecution. There was no probative value to be gained by 
showing the film to the jury, other than to inflame their 
prejudice and passion for the brutal crime committed upon the 
victim. The film obviously had a dramatic effect in convicting 
the defendant, the only person the jury could act out against in 
their collective revulsion, because the jury requested, and were 
allowed to review the film during their deliberations. 
Consequently, the errors committed in the trial of this 
case compounded one another, to the point that the defendant was 
viii 




THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WHEN 
THE PROSECUTOR, UNFAIRLY CALLED ATTENTION TO 
WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS AN OVERSIGHT ON THE 
PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly outlined the stan-
dards for determining whether or not remarks made by counsel in 
their arguments to the jury are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case. Attorneys have considerable 
latitude in commenting on the evidence during opening statements 
and summation. However, such discretion is not without limits, 
and when the comments of counsel would have a tendency to draw 
fhe jury's attention away from the issues of fact, and concen-
trate on what the prosecutor considers an error in the manner in 
which defense counsel tried the case, reversal is mandated. 
The leading case in the State of Utah with respect to 
the issue of when improper comments during a closing argument are 
so likely to have influenced the verdict that they require 
reversal, is State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, (Utah 1973). The 
facts in that case involve a defendant who was convicted of the 
crime of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. The defendant in that case did not deny that he shot his 
wife but pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Defendant, on appeal, contended that the remarks of the prose-
cution in rebuttal to defendant's closing argument were improper, 
prejudicial and constituted reversible error. Defendant failed 
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to assert an objection during the course of the argument and the 
trial court had no opportunity to determine the matter or caution 
the jury. Defendant, because of the special circumstances in 
this case, was denied a reversal. However, the Court sets a very 
clear standard for determining whether or not improper comments 
of counsel during arguments to the jury require reversal. 
Counsel for both sides have considerable 
latitude in their arguments to the jury; they 
have a right to discuss fully from their 
standpoints the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom. The test of 
whether the remarks are so objectionable as to 
merit a reversal in criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and 
were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks, (p.426) (Emphasis added) 
The test outlined in Valdez is a two part test. First, the 
remarks must be improper and second, they must have probably 
influenced the jurors. The competency of defense counsel or his 
'oversights1 are not matters which are properly considered by 
jurors in determining their verdict. Jurors must rely upon the 
evidence presented and the credibility of the witnesses in 
determining the verdict. 
A California case clearly shows that statements dispar-
aging opposing counsel are improper remarks. In the case of 
People v. Perry, 499 P.2d 129, (Cal. 1972), the California 
Supreme Court discussed disparaging remarks directed towards 
opposing counsel in closing arguments in a homicide case. 
Defendant, on appeal, contended that the prosecution's closing 
-2-
argument was essentially a personal attack on defense counsel. 
The Court finds these disparaging remarks to be improper but 
refused to grant a reversal on the basis that the improper 
remarks weren't made in a case where it was likely that they 
would influence the verdict. However, the Court indicates that 
in certain cases such comments would require reversal because 
such remarks would probably influence the verdict. 
Unfortunately, we must conclude that the 
prosecutor did commit misconduct during his 
rebuttal argument; however, we must note that 
the improper remarks were made in response to a 
highly inflammatory argument made by Redmon's 
[defendant's] counsel. Although the remarks of 
a defense counsel do not justify retaliation 
by the prosecution, such remarks must be 
considered in assessing the prejudicial effect 
of the prosecutorial misconduct....(p.150) 
The rebuttal argument was a response to defense 
counsel's inflammatory attack upon the prose-
cution. It is probable that the jurors viewed 
the argument as mere polemic retaliation 
intended to rehabilitate the integrity of the 
maligned law enforcement agencies and gave it 
little or no consideration...For these reasons, 
we conclude that the prosecutorial misconduct 
was not likely to have caused a miscarriage of 
justice, that the objection to the misconduct 
was not timely, and therefore that reversal of 
the judgment is not justified on this ground, 
(p.151) 
A case from Nevada agrees with the California court in 
holding that remarks disparaging defense counsel constitute 
misconduct. The case is McGuire v. State, 677 P.2d 1060 (Nev. 
1984). This case consolidates two criminal cases; one where the 
defendant was convicted of robbery and the second where the 
defendant was convicted of sexual assault. Both cases were tried 
by the same prosecutor who engaged in various acts of prose-
-3-
cutorial misconduct in the two cases. The Court shows a great 
concern for the problem of prosecutorial misconduct and its 
effect on the jury and its ultimate result of depriving an 
accused of his or her right to a fair trial and the additional 
expense incurred in the hearing of appeals and the necessity of a 
retrial in many cases. The statements of the prosecutor in the 
second of the consolidated cases served only to belittle defense 
counsel, 
We can discern no purpose for the statement 
other than as an attempt to belittle defense 
counsel in front of the jury* * * Disparaging 
comments have absolutely no place in a court-
room, and clearly constitute misconduct, 
(p.1064) 
That case seems to leave no doubt that attempts to 
belittle defense counsel or to disparage him or his work are 
unquestionably acts of misconduct which necessarily means that 
they have met the first step of the Valdez test. However, just 
meeting the first portion of the two-step Valdez test is not 
sufficient. The second step must also be met. The Utah Supreme 
Court discussed the second step of the Valdez test more fully in 
the case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984). The Court, 
in that case, quoted the language of the Valdez case regarding 
the two-part test. They then continued their discussion and 
created specific standards with which to judge step two of the 
test: 
Step two is more difficult and involves a 
consideration of the circumstances of the case 
as a whole. In making such a consideration, it 
is appropriate to look at the evidence of 
defendantf s guilt. 
,fIf proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be 
presumed pre judicial.ff (Citing cases) Like-
wise, in a case with less compelling proof, 
this Court will more closely scrutinize the 
conduct. If the conclusion of jurors is 
based on their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing inter-
pretations, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will be improperly influenced through 
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the 
jurors may be searching for guidance in 
weighing and interpreting the evidence. 
They may be especially susceptible to influ-
ence, and a small degree of influence may be 
sufficient to affect the verdict. Counsel is 
obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as 
possible, any reference to those matters the 
jury is not justified in considering. 
In this case, there was no compelling proof of 
defendant's guilt. The jury could have found 
either way. Consequently, we are compelled to 
find that the second step of the Valdez test 
has been met. The jurors were t!probably 
influenced by'1 the remarks of the prosecutor. 
While the trial court properly attempted 
to correct the errors, the potential for harm, 
the probability for harm, and the continued 
efforts of the prosecutor were too flagrant to 
be corrected, (pp.486-487) 
The decision in Troy defines the type of case where 
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor will be presumed 
prejudicial. As required by the Troy decision, the Dibello case 
is one where proof of the defendant's guilt was not strong. This 
case is made up of circumstantial evidence. Conflicting testi-
mony was given concerning every fact in evidence.' The finger-
print experts of the State and the defendant, testified differ-
ently concerning the bloody hand print. The experts who testi-
fied for the State came to the conclusion that the print could be 
identified as that of the defendant. (Testimony of Rick Summers 
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pp. 359-360 Sc 392 and Scott Pratt p. 971.) Conflicting testimony 
was given by the expert who testified for defendant. He stated 
that the print could not be identified as that of defendant. 
(Testimony of Wade Robinson pp. 799-801.) The blood which was 
found on the door was unable to be typed and defendant had a 
possible explanation for its present there even if it were found 
to be his hand print. (Testimony of Martha Kerr pp. 452-453 and 
defendant pp. 938 & 946.) Two versions were given of the 
behavior of defendant when intoxicated. (Testimony of Bill 
Russell p.545, Kristi Dibello Russell p. 590, Gary Barker p.837, 
Cordell Griffiths p.841, and Rex Nielsen p.848.) Conflicting 
evidence was given as to every fact discussed at trial. This 
case is clearly the type of case defined in Troy. 
One further misconduct of the prosecutor which demands 
reversal occurred in his closing arguments where he indicated his 
personal belief in Jerry Dibello1s guilt and implied that defense 
witnesses should not be believed. During his closing arguments, 
the prosecutor said, 
I hope you looked at the defendant closely, but 
I suggest to you that it is evident, based on 
what you observed and the other testimony in 
this case, that the defendant did not tell the 
truth as to what he did on July 20. I think he 
lied about what happened also up in Settlement 
Canyon, (p.35) 
You have the statement where he said there 
isn't any blood on my shoes. How about your 
shoes? He comments that there's no blood on my 
shoes. Again, I think it's evident that he knew 
he wasn't wearing those, (p.37) 
[In referring to Wade Robinson, defendant's 
fingerprint expert.] I think he caught himself 
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up when he was t e s t i f y i n g . . . I think he probably 
b i t off a l i t t l e more than he could chew, 
(p.30) 
And I think he was wrong in one statement he 
made. I think when the d e f e n d a n t ' s expe r t 
says, I'm not able to make an explanation; and 
I think he made an error when he sa id , since I 
c an ' t make an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , I have to exclude 
the defendant, (p.59) 
Behavior of exactly t h i s sor t was discussed in the case 
of State v. Reed, 684 P.2d 699 (Wash. 1984). In that case , the 
Court r e f e r s to a d i s c i p l i n a r y rule which is v io la ted by such 
behavior on the part of the prosecutor . 
The Code of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , DR 
7 - 1 0 6 ( 0 ( 4 ) , s t a t e s u n e q u i v o c a b ly that : an 
a t t o r n e y s h a l l no t [ a j s s e r t h i s p e r s o n a l 
opinion as to the jus tness of a cause , as to 
t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s , . . . o r as to 
the g u i l t of innocence of an accused; but he 
may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for 
any posi t ion or conclusion with respect to the 
matters s ta ted here in . 
Here the prosecutor c lea r ly v io la ted (CPR) DR 
7-106(0(4) by asser t ing his personal opinion 
of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witness and the g u i l t 
or innocence of the accused. F i r s t , he cal led 
the pe t i t i one r a l i a r no less than four t imes. 
Next, the prosecutor s t a t e d t h a t the defense 
c o u n s e l did not have a c a s e , and t h a t the 
p e t i t i o n e r was c l e a r l y a " m u r d e r t o o " . 
F ina l ly , he implied that the defense witnesses 
should not be b e l i e v e d . . . . 
"Language which might be permitted to counsel 
in summing up a c i v i l a c t i o n c a n n o t w i t h 
p ropr ie ty be used by a public prosecutor , who 
i s a quas i - jud ic ia l o f f i ce r , r ep re sen t ing the 
Peop l e of the s t a t e , and presumed to ac t 
impar t ia l ly in the i n t e r e s t only of j u s t i c e . 
If he lays aside the impar t i a l i ty tha t should 
charac ter ize his o f f i c i a l a c t i o n to become a 
heated p a r t i s a n , and by v i t u p e r a t i o n of the 
pr isoner and appeals to p r e j u d i c e , seeks to 
procure a conviction at a l l hazards, he ceases 
to p rope r ly r e p r e s e n t the pub l i c i n t e r e s t , 
- 7 -
which demands no victim, and asks no convic-
tion through the aid of passion, sympathy or 
resentment,ff (p. 702) 
The prosecutor in the Dibello matter called Jerry 
Dibello a liar or indicated that he, himself, thought that Jerry 
Dibello was lying at least twice. He implied that defense 
witnesses should not be believed. Rather than simply pointing 
out inconsistencies or possible attacks on the credibility of 
defendant 
and defense witnesses, the prosecutor in this action asserted his 
personal belief as to the credibility of defendant and defense 
witnesses. 
It should also be mentioned that the State of Utah has 
clearly recognized the right of a defendant to assert inconsis-
tent defenses, the very thing which prosecutor attacked in his 
closing arguments. In the case of State v. Mitcheson, 560 P. 2d 
1120, 1122 (Utah 1977), the Court said this: 
It is our judgment that the position of the 
defendant * * * is not necessarily incon-
sistent. ..Furthermore, even if they were 
inconsistent, that should not deprive the 
defendant of either defense. 
In a criminal case the defendant need not 
specially plead his defenses. The entry of a 
plea of not guilty places upon the State the 
burden of proving every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This gives the 
defendant the benefit of every defense thereto 
which may cause a reasonable doubt to exist as 
to his guilt, arising either from the evidence, 
or lack of evidence, in the case; and this is 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THERE 
WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 
SUBMIT THIS CASE TO THE JURY 
It is well established that the burden of proof in a 
criminal case lies with the State. The State has the burden of 
proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
defendant has no obligation to prove any affirmative defense. In 
order to meet this burden, the State must present a prima facie 
case. The Supreme Court of Utah has, in numerous cases, stated 
that in presenting defenses in criminal cases, a defendant does 
not bear the burden of persuasion. The Court in State v. Torres, 
619 p.2d 694,695 (Utah 1980) reemphasized the allocation of 
burdens in criminal cases. 
It is sufficient for acquittal that the 
evidence or lack thereof creates a reasonable 
doubt as to any element of the crime, (citing 
cases) The ultimate burden of proving the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
remains on the state, whether defendant offers 
any evidence in an effort to prove affirm-
ative defenses or not. 
The standard by which an appellate court must determine whether 
or not a verdict should be set aside is stated in State v. 
Sullivan, 307 P.2d 212 (Utah 1957). 
The defendants' essay to demonstrate that the 
evidence leaves such doubt as to their identi-
fication as the culprits in this crime that 
they were entitled to a dismissal. For them to 
prevail on that proposition it must appear 
that, viewing the evidence and all fair 
inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
reasonable minds could not believe them guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but would neces-
-9-
sarily entertain some substantial doubt of 
their guilt, (p.214) 
But it is not sufficient merely that reasonable 
minds may have entertained such doubt. Before 
a verdict may properly be set aside, it must 
appear that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting 
fairly upon it must have entertained reasonable 
doubt that defendant committed the crime. 
Unless the evidence compels such conclusion as 
a matter of law, the verdict must stand, 
(p.215) 
The evidence in the Dibello case is so inconclusive that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt as to the 
guilt of the defendant. All of the evidence against the defen-
dant in this case is circumstantial, and while that is not 
to say that the State could not convict on circumstantial 
evidence, it is to suggest that before it can convict there must 
be sufficient evidence to carry the prosecution's burden. The 
evidence here consists of the following: 
1) the defendant and the victim were married 
and were separated at the time of the murder (Testimony of Larry 
Smith p.45, Teresa Stearns p.86, Shane Jacobsen pp.162-164, Tracy 
AA p.653 and defendant pp.867 & 878.). 
2) the defendant came to the S&W Trailer park 
to see his wife, the night of the murder (Testimony of Bill 
Jackson p.110, Dennis Haggar p.130 and defendant p.895.), 
3) defendant indicated to his wife at the 
trailer of B.J. Jackson that he had returned to the trailer park 
to pick up some of his clothing. 
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4) defendant entered the trailer where the 
victim was murdered on the night of July 20, 1985, in order to 
pick up his clothes (Testimony of defendant pp.900 & 938.). 
5) the victim left the trailer of B.J. Jackson 
shortly after the defendant left that trailer (Testimony of Bill 
Jackson p.110, Dennis Haggard pp.131 8c 133 and defendant p.895). 
6) there were bloody fingerprints on the 
outside door of the trailer, which may or may not have been the 
defendant's (Testimony of Rick Summers, Scott Pratt and Wade 
Robinsons). 
7) the victim had, in her hand, two hairs 
which may or may not have been defendant's (Testimony of Martha 
pp.431-435), and, 
8) there were traces of blood in the defend-
ant's truck, on a shirt and on his person, the only sample of 
blood which was large enough to be typed was taken from the shirt 
and matched defendant's blood type, not that of the victim. 
(Testimony of Martha Kerr, p.456.) 
The evidence of defendant's guilt is extremely sparse, 
and inconclusive. The only evidence which is truly relevant to 
the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence is controverted. The 
fingerprint experts of the State and the defendant testified 
differently as to the identification of the prints found on the 
outside door of the trailer where the victim \*is found. The 
expert for the State said that they could be identified as the 
defendant's, the expert for defendant said that they could not be 
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identified as those of the defendant. The traces of blood found 
on the defendant and in his truck could be explained by the 
testimony given in the trial as to a fight that occurred between 
defendant and Larry Smith on the night of July 15, 1986. This 
would correspond with the testimony of Martha Kerr that the trace 
of blood which would be typed were identified as type B which is 
the type of the defendant while the victim was type 0. 
As stated in the Sullivan and Torres cases, supra, the 
defendant does not have the burden of proving his innocence. He 
is presumed innocent until proven guilty. In this case, the 
State failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to justify a 
determination of guilt on the part of the defendant. The 
evidence is entirely circumstantial and so inconclusive that 
reasonable minds, acting only upon the evidence presented and 
their determination of the credibility of the witnesses would 
necessarily have to have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. The State, in its closing argument, 
relied heavily on supposition, creating a case wherein defendant 
was motivated by jealousy to murder his wife. In closing, the 
State referred to a letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 65, and read from 
it referring to the victim's feelings towards defendant and her 
attitude on her marriage. The letter and the prosecutor's 
prejudicial statements previously mentioned, played a large part 
in the State's closing argument which was the first time it was 
read. The evidence does not call for a conviction of defendant 
but rather an acquittal. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ALLOWING HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED 
REGARDING THE VICTIM'S STATE OF MIND AND 
ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO COMMENT ON THE SAME 
WHEN NO EVIDENCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, SUICIDE OR 
ACCIDENT WAS INTRODUCED BY THE STATE OR THE 
DEFENDANT. 
Hearsay evidence and the rules pertaining to it are some 
of the most complicated and controversial areas of the law. The 
very fact that in the Utah Code, Rules of Evidence, Rules 803 and 
804, there are a total of twenty-nine statutory exceptions to the 
hearsay rule, twenty-four for when the declarant is available and 
five pertaining to situations where the declarant is unavailable, 
indicates the complex nature of the issue of hearsay and excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. Case law has clarified many of 
the exceptions and indicated when they are available and when 
they are not. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 
1377, 1380 & 1381 (Utah 1977), discussed the admission of 
pre-death hearsay statements of a victim in a homicide case. The 
Court held, in a situation which parallels, almost exactly, the 
Dibello case, that pre-death hearsay statements concerning the 
victim's fear of the defendant are not admissable. The state-
ments had been allowed in under Rule 63 (12) of thk Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The rules of evidence have subsequently been altered 
and renumbered and the exception is now Rule 803(3). The 
Supreme Court has this to say, 
Pre-death hearsay statements of a victim in 
homicide cases are generally admissable when 
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the defendant claims self-defense. They may 
also be properly admitted where the defense is 
that the death was accidental and that the 
victim was an aggressor. They are not gener-
ally admitted in criminal cases where self-
defense is not* at issue* * * * . Wfrer^  it iso 
claimed the deceased committed suicide there 
would seem to be relevance in the hearsay 
statements of the decedent which would tend to 
explain acts or conduct on the part of the 
declarant * * * 
Whether the victim loved or hated the defen-
dant, or whether she feared him or ignored him 
throws no light on his guilt or innocence. The 
jurors were most likely to believe that the 
statements made by the wife were true and that 
the defendant had beaten her and threat-
ened to kill her; therefore, he did kill her. 
(emphasis added). 
The Court, in that case, reversed the conviction. The 
situation in Wauneka closely parallels the Dibello facts. In 
Wauneka, the defendant was charged with the crime of murder in 
the second degree and found guilty of manslaughter. The evidence 
admitted was a statement made by the deceased to an acquaintance 
about five days before her death. The statement was to the 
effect that if the defendant found out that the deceased had 
called the police about his beating her, he would kill her. 
In the Dibello case, two separate incidents involving 
hearsay statements of the deceased were introduced by the 
prosecution at trial, the first occurred during the testimony of 
Shane Jacobsen where he testified that the victim had said to 
him, lfTammy asked me if I didn't mind staying with her because 
she was frightened of Jerry11, (p.162) and the second was a 
letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 65, which was admitted into 
evidence during the testimony of Tracy AA. (p.652). A portion of 
that letter was first read by the prosecutor to the jury during 
his closing arguments, (p.31). The portion read by the prose-
cutor follows: 
Jerry, the romance has left your heart and, I 
guess, mine, too. I can't even talk to you 
anymore because I am afraid of you. You have 
done all you can for me and I'm afraid of you. 
Don't you think that's silly? 
This portion of the letter is not even as probative as the 
statements which were not allowed to be introduced in the Wauneka 
case. The letter written by Tammy Dibello was intended for her 
husband, only. In the Wauneka case, the statement was made to an 
acquaintance while the deceased was seeking help. She was asking 
for help, for someone to call the police. A letter intended for 
the eyes of the defendant, is not relevant to the issue of guilt 
or innocence. The letter failed to state why the victim was 
afraid of the defendant or in what way and it is entirely 
unrelated to defendant's attitude toward his wife. The letter 
merely reflects Tammy Dibellofs feelings at some, unknown point 
in time. Neither does the statement purportedly made by the 
victim to Shane Jacobsen explain her fear. It doesn't say if 
she's afraid the defendant will return to work things out or hurt 
her physically or whatever else her fear may have been. These 
are the very reasons why hearsay evidence is not ,admissable. If 
the victim were available to testify, perhaps she could clear up 
any mystery surrounding her statements, but that is not possible. 
Furthermore, according to the Wauneka decision, the 
attitude of the deceased toward the defendant, is not relevant or 
-15-
admissable in a homicide case unless the issues of self-defense, 
suicide or accident are raised. Those issues were not raised 
here, by either the defendant or the State. Therefore, the 
holding in the Wauneka decision must be controlling here, and 
this case must be reversed. 
Furthermore, neither the statement in the letter nor the 
testimony of Shane Jacobsen meet the standards of Rule 804(b)(5), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, U.C.A., 1953, as amended which reads, in 
pertinent part: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness.* * * (5) Other exceptions. A state-
ment not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, 
if the court determines that (A) the statement 
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) 
the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and the interest of 
justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence, (emphasis added). 
The statements admitted in the Dibello case do not meet 
the standards set by Rule 804(b)(5). There is no equivalent 
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. The exceptions are 
based upon circumstances where it would be unlikely that the 
declarant was lying. The exceptions for when the declarant is 
not available to testify concern former testimony, including 
depositions, where the statements are transcribed before a court 
reporter or stenographer while the declarant is under oath. The 
second exception is a statement under belief of impending death, 
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the third, a statement against interest and the fourth, a 
statement of personal or family history. These exceptions are 
limited to times when it was unlikely that the declarant was 
lying or exaggerating. Neither the statements in the letter or 
the statement purportedly made to Shane Jacobsen are not of this 
quality at all. There were no special circumstances which would 
indicate that the things said were true. The statements of the 
deceased with respect to her fear of the defendant, were made 
without explanation. The deceased merely said that she was 
afraid of the defendant. The general purpose of the rules of 
evidence is to be as certain as is reasonably possible, that the 
evidence presented in a courtroom is true, or at least contains 
some truth or there is some likelihood that the statements are 
true. That is the reason for the oaths that witnesses take and 
the rules of evidence which operate in a court of law. Truth, to 
our minds, is the best insurance of justice. Here, there is no 
guarantee of truth and no opportunity for explanation in order to 
discover the truth. Therefore, these statements should not have 
been admitted into evidence or heard by the jury. 
Another statement was admitted into evidence in contra-
vention of the Rules of Evidence. Tinly Gibbons, during her 
testimony, testified that during a conversation with the defen-
dant on July 13, 1985, defendant threatened to kill Tammy 
Dibello. flAnd then Jerry said that if Tammy ever left him that 
he would kill her." (p.488) Even if the statement could be 
proven to be relevant, it still was prejudicial error to admit it 
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into evidence under Rule 4U3, U.C.A. Rules of Evidence, 1953, as 
amended, which reads: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence. 
Rule 403 clearly indicates that evidence which is 
relevant, may still be excluded when its probative value is 
outweighed by its tendency to prejudice. In this case, the 
probative value of the statement is slight. It does not relate 
to the situation existing at the time of the victimfs death. 
Even, if the defendant had actually meant that statement or 
intended it as a threat or indication of future action, the facts 
introduced at trial, show that defendant left his wife, not that 
his wife left him. Even if relevant, the prejudicial value of 
this statement strongly outweighs its probative value. The 
prejudice created by the admission of such a statement is great. 
The jury is likely to believe that the defendant simply followed 
up on his threat. The probative value of the statement is 
slight. It doesn't actually involve the defendant in the murder, 
it doesn't relate to any of the physical evidence presented and 
it doesnft show the defendant's state of mind on the night of 
July 20, 1986. 
Clearly, the trial court committed prejudicial error 
which mandates a reversal ^hen it admitted the foregoing hearsay 
evidence as to the decedent's state of mind. The Court also 
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erred in admitting defendants statement when that statement was 
not related to the circumstances exiting at the time of defen-
dant's wife or to the time immediately preceding her death. 
It was simply one of those off the cuff statements many men make, 
but which do not express actual animus towards their wives. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE VIDEO TAPE OF THE VICTIM'S 
BODY AND THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN HER 
MOBILE HOME BY THE POLICE TO BE ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE AND SHOWN TO THE JURY BOTH DURING 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF AND DURING THE JURY'S 
DELIBERATION. 
Video tapes are a relative newcomer in the field of 
criminal investigation. Their impact on a jury has been careful-
ly analyzed because the old adage, though trite, is true: one 
picture is worth a thousand words. Pictures create a greater 
impact than language. Video tapes make an even stronger impres-
sion. The thing of importance in a court of law is not sympathy 
or shock. The jury should be concerned with facts and matters of 
evidence. Courts have expressed the fear that pictures and video 
tapes of murder victims may arouse a blood-lust in the jury, a 
shock and horror which only finds its outlet in a scapegoat, 
which, in a criminal action, is obviously the defendant. The 
Supreme Court of Utah discussed that admission into evidence of 
slides made of the victim during the course of the autopsy. 
These slides were shown to the jury on a screen set up in the 
courtroom. The defense counsel failed to make a proper objection 
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to the admission of the slides. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
found the admission of the slides to be prejudicial error and 
proper grounds for reversal of the judgment and remand in the 
case of State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 514-515 (Utah 1968). 
Finally, defendant contends the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting some colored 
slides into evidence and permitting them to be 
displayed to the jury by means of a slide 
projector and screen. With this contention, we 
are in agreement. 
To begin with, the identity of the deceased, 
his death and its cause had already been 
established * * * 
Initially, it is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court to determine whether the 
inflammatory nature of such slides is out-
weighed by their probative value with respect 
to a fact in issue. If the latter they may be 
admitted even though gruesome. In the instant 
case they had no probative value. All the 
material facts which could conceivably have 
been adduced from a viewing of the slides had 
been established by uncontradicted lay and 
medical testimony. The only purpose served was 
to inflame and arouse the jury. 
In the Dibello case, the identity of the victim and the cause of 
death were already established. Neither the identity of the 
victim nor the cause of death were at issue. Both sides were in 
complete agreement that the victim was Tammy Dibello and that the 
cause of death was multiple stab wounds. The State introduced 
testimony from Dr. Armano Salazar which discussed in detail the 
injuries sustained by the victim, the condition of the body and 
the cause of death. The video tape does not meet the standard 
created in State v. Poe. 
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The inflammatory nature of a video tape showing the 
victim1 s body was not outweighed by the probative value of the 
tape with respect to a act in issue. Prior to the introduction 
of the tape, the jury had already been shown several pictures of 
the victim. Plaintiff's Exhibits1 6, 9, and 10 were photographs 
of the victim, after death. P-10 showed the stab wound to the 
victim. P-6 and P-9 showed the body of the victim. The video-
tape of the victim added nothing new to the juryfs knowledge. It 
only served to shock them with an extremely unpleasant represen-
tation of a murder victim. The video tape also showed the site 
of the murder. However, the site of the murder was discussed and 
explained in Plaintifffs Exhibits 5, 74 and 75. P-5 was a chart 
of the trailer layout and it was representative of the condition 
of the trailer at the time of the murder. P-74 and P-75 were 
photographs of the inside of the Dibello trailer. Alan James 
testified that they accurately represented the Dibello trailer on 
the day he made his investigation, July 21, 1985. (T. pp. 723-
725). The video tape showed the door to the trailer which was 
also shown in Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 27, 30 and 32. Once again, 
the evidence is redundant. Also, it displayed the wood block 
which held knives which was introduced into evidence as P-72. 
All of the information presented by the video tape was redundant 
and had either already been testified to or was shortly to be 
testified to, all of it with visual aids, either the actual 
object(s) or a photographic representation of the object(s). 
Even if there had not been other evidence introduced with respect 
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to these matters, they could have been shown on the video tape 
without displaying the victim's body which could have been edited 
out or fast-forwarded over. The video tapes did not serve to 
inform the jury, or give them any evidence with respect to a fact 
in issue. Their only purpose and effect was to shock, inflame 
and arouse the jury. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not abandoned their views on 
the possible harms of visual evidence of victims1 bodies. It has 
restated its position in the case of State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 
810, 813 (Utah 1979). That case involved a shooting. Defendant 
was charged with manslaughter and found guilty. During the 
trial, color photographs of the bullet wound were admitted into 
evidence. The pictures depict a close-up view of a bullet wound 
in the deceased's chest. On appeal, the defendant claimed that 
the photographs had no probative value and served only to inflame 
and prejudice the jury. The Court found that the admission of 
the photographs was error but not prejudicial error and there-
fore, not reversible. 
We have reviewed the photographs of which 
the defendant complains and find that they are 
not gruesome or offensive such that in their 
absence there would have been a reasonable 
probability or likelihood the result would have 
been more favorable to the defendant. * * * 
Because the defendant did not dispute 
shooting Dirks, and because the medical 
examiner testified that the victim died as a 
result of the gunshot, the admission of the 
photographs was superfluous. We do not condone 
the admission of the photographs in this 
case, since we are able to find no evidentiary 
value for the photographs other than the 
hoped-for emotional impact on the jury. 
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The Court found, in that case, that the error was not 
such as would require a reversible, because it was a harmless 
error. The defendant in that case admitted to shooting the 
victim but claimed it was a case of self-defense. The pictures 
did not show the victim, just the bullet wound to his chest. The 
evidence supporting self-defense was very slim. The defendant, 
at the time of his arrest, informed the police that he "shot the 
son-of-a-bitch because he owed me $243.00 for a phone bill.11 The 
defendant had threatened the victim's life in the presence of 
several witnesses a few days earlier. Such is not the situation 
in the Dibello case. The evidence presented by the State 
relating to the guilt of the defendant was circumstantial and 
conflicting testimony was given with respect to the identi-
fication of the bloody fingerprints. The defendant did not 
admit to murdering his wife, self defense was not an issue. 
Furthermore, the videotape didn't just show the wounds, they 
showed the victim, as she was found, the morning after her 
murder. A videotape of a woman lying lifeless, in glorious 
color, stained with blood, and a gaping wound across her throat 
is a much harder picture to be objective about than a close-up of 
a bullet wound with no fact attached, no person attached to the 
wound. The jury knew that the victim in Wells had been murdered, 
but they never saw him dead. Viewing death can create feelings 
of fear, helplessness, rage and many other strong emotions. 
These emotions can influence a jury. They've seen a murder, 
something which shouldn't have happened and they want to avenge, 
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to punish and the only logical outlet for those feelings in a 
criminal case is the defendant. 
The introduction of a videotape of the victim in a case 
where the information displayed by the tape was redundant and had 
no probative value can only serve to inflame the jury. The 
Court, in Wells, refused to reverse the verdict because they 
found that the harm done by the admission of the photos was not 
prejudicial because there was not a reasonable probability or 
likelihood that in the absence of those photos, there would have 
been a result more favorable to the defendant. In the Dibello 
case, the evidence supporting the Statefs case against the 
defendant is very weak. In fact, as argued in Point III, the 
evidence wasn't sufficient to support the verdict rendered. The 
videotape of the victim clearly influenced the jury in their 
rendering of a verdict, as indicated by the jury's request to 
view the video film after retiring. Errors which are harmless in 
cases where the evidence is strong in support of either party are 
prejudicial in cases where the evidence is conflicting and fails 
to clearly support either party. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of State of 
Garcia , 663 P2.d 60, 64 (Utah 1983), again emphasized its 
position with respect to the question of photographs of a 
homicide victim. 
The p o i n t of t he r e f e r e n c e t o " e s s e n t i a l 
ev iden t i a ry value1 ' in the con tex t of poten-
t i a l l y pre judic ia l photographs of the v ic t im ' s 
body is that such photographs would gene ra l ly 
be i n a p p r o p r i a t e where t he on ly r e l e v a n t 
evidence they convey can be put before the jury 
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readily and accurately by other means not 
accompanied by the potential prejudice. 
In the Dibello case, not only could the evidence have 
been 'readily and accurately1 conveyed by other means, not 
accompanied by the potential prejudice, but in fact, the evidence 
was so conveyed. The admission of the videotape was entirely 
superfluous and only served to shock and arouse the jury. 
Obviously the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to 
introduce the video tape when it was so clearly cumulative on 
those issues where probative, and extremely inflammatory in over 
all nature. Reversal is the only remedy for such a gross 
discretionary violation. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Jerry DiBello was tried and convicted on 
circumstantial evidence which was marginal as to its probative 
value of guilt. The only evidence which may have had any real 
value in determining the defendantfs guilt was the finger prints 
on the door, and the defendant's expert certainly raised reason-
able doubt as to whether reliance on the reliability of that 
evidence could be had by the jury. The State committed gross 
error in commenting on the veracity of the defendant's witnesses, 
the defendant's own testimony, and alleging that the defendant's 
counsel hau UUL proper A^ ^itocuucu Lis case. The Court should 
have granted a new trial on that issue alone. Unfortunately for 
Jerry DiBello, the Court also erred in allowing the inflamitory 
video tape of the crime scene and Jerry's wife's lifeless body 
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which was almost constantly before the viewer with multiple stab 
wounds and a cut throat to be seen by the jury when its viewing 
could have had no probative value. 
Defendant respectfully submits that this is a case which 
cries out for relief. Jerry DiBello was not convicted by a jury 
viewing dispassionately evidence sufficient to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was guilty. He was tried and convicted 
as a consequence of prosecutor misconduct, innuendo and inflam-
matory evidence which the trial court allowed to go to the 
jury. While is it always in the public interest to seek a 
criminal conviction of the guilty party in a homicide situation, 
there is a greater public interest in seeing that the guilty 
party is brought to justice, and justice requires that the rules 
and laws be followed. In the instant case, justice was denied 
its reward, because of the prejudicial errors committed during 
the trial of the defendant. Jerry DiBello, an innocent man, was 
convicted as a consequence of those prejudicial errors, and does 
respectfully request that the conviction be reversed. 
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